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Picture: Carlo Bossoli - Paris Bourse Franz Schubert Work: Symphony No.3 in D-major, D.200 (1815) Mov.I: Adagio maestoso - Allegro con brio 00:00 Mov.II: Allegretto 09:35 Mov.III: Menuetto: Vivace 13:54 Mov.IV: Presto vivace 18:04 Orchestra: Failoni Orchestra Conductor: Michael Halász The Allegro con brio, which follows a broad introduction in a form which reminds us of the French Overture in two parts, the first slow and dramatic, the second more lyrical, is remarkable for its charm and the interplay of solo clarinet with syncopated strings, which developed pp from within the bounds of the style of chamber music to the larger sphere of the symphonic form. This is an extremely dramatic movement in sonata form. It owes much, as Michael Trapp points out in the liner notes of Günter Wand's recording, to the influence of Rossini, whose music was quite popular at the time, particularly evident in the overture-like structure. A delightful Allegretto in ternary form follows, full of grace and humor. Then comes a high-spirited Minuet, which, with its accented up-beats, suggests a scherzo and a popular flavor due to this low and popular gesture, and is contrasted by a graceful Ländler-like trio. The concluding Presto in tarantella rhythm is remarkable for its bold harmonic progressions and for its wealth of dynamic contrast. This movement is in sonata form with a looser conception.

Official Video for "The House Is Rockin'" by Stevie Ray Vaughan Stevie Ray Vaughan was a legendary blues guitarist and singer from Texas, known for his soulful playing and powerful vocals. He rose to fame in the 1980s with hits like "Pride and Joy", "Texas Flood", and "The Sky is Crying", which showcased his incredible guitar skills and deep love for the blues. Vaughan collaborated with many other artists throughout his career, including David Bowie (on the song "Let's Dance"), blues icon B.B. King (on the album "In Session") and his brother Jimmie Vaughan (on their “family Style” album). He was also heavily influenced by other blues legends like Albert King, Freddie King, and Jimi Hendrix, whose playing styles he incorporated into his own unique sound. Listen to Stevie Ray Vaughan:

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[Chorus:] Well - The house is a rockin' don't bother knockin' Yeah - The house is a rockin' don't bother knockin' Yeah - The house is a rockin' don't bother come on in #StevieRayVaughan #TheHouseIsRockin #OfficialVideo

Franz Ignaz Beck (Mannheim, February 20, 1734 – Bordeaux, December 31, 1809) was a German violinist, composer, conductor and music teacher who spent the greater part of his life in France, where he became director of the Grand Théâtre de Bordeaux. La Stagione Frankfurt conducted by Michael Schneider 00:00 Allegro Moderato 06:07 Andante un Poco Allegro 12:38 Minuettos I & II 15:41 Presto Enjoy the work. Julian

This video based by article is a personal account of U.S. Army Colonel Norvell DeAtkine's experience in dealing with Arab militaries for over 40 years. This video provides an in-depth analysis of the performance of Arabic-speaking armies in the modern era, examining their struggles and challenges across various historical conflicts. It begins by exploring how Egyptian regular forces faced difficulties against Yemeni irregulars in the 1960s, a period marked by intense military strategy shifts in the Middle East. Similarly, Syrians managed to assert control in Lebanon during the mid-1970s, but only through the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers, rather than tactical brilliance. One of the most notable examples of ineffectiveness came from the Iraqis during the 1980s when they were pitted against an Iranian military deeply affected by revolutionary turmoil. Despite the disarray in Iran, the Iraqis failed to secure a decisive victory and could not win a three-decade-long war against the Kurds. The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war was similarly underwhelming, highlighting the mediocre combat history of the region's forces, especially when compared to the more formidable Allied Forces and Axis Powers of World War II. This video seeks to uncover why this unimpressive record persists, delving into a myriad of factors—economic, ideological, and technical—that have historically hampered Arab armies. Yet, perhaps the most critical factor is cultural, encompassing certain societal attributes that inhibit these forces from producing an effective military presence on the battlefield. The insights you will hear are grounded in the personal experiences of Norville B. De Atkin, who spent nearly three decades in the Middle East as a U.S. military attaché and security assistance officer. Through his lens, we gain an understanding of how military tactics are developed and implemented—or, as often is the case, how they fall short—due to deeply ingrained cultural practices. It's a well-established truth in military history that an army fights as it is trained. Atkin's firsthand observations of Arab military training reveal much about how these forces approach modern warfare and why they frequently struggle to meet the demands of strategic warfare. Despite nearly 25 years passing since his initial assessments, it appears that little has changed in the effectiveness of these armies, especially when compared to other global forces. The video also critiques the problematic nature of incorporating culture into strategic assessments. Historically, this approach has led to wild distortions, as seen with the U.S. Army in the 1930s, which misjudged the Japanese national character, leading to incorrect assumptions about their technological capabilities. Hitler's underestimation of the United States as a "mongrel society" similarly backfired, showing the dangers of relying too heavily on cultural stereotypes in warfare. These examples underscore the risk of making assumptions about military abilities based on cultural attributes, which often leads to overconfidence or, conversely, underestimation of an adversary's capabilities. The video also touches on the evolution of military subculture over time, noting how past performances can lead to erroneous conclusions about future conflicts. The dismal French performance in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War misled the German high command into overestimating the French Army's capabilities during World War I. Conversely, Israeli generals underestimated the Egyptian Army in 1973, based on their lackluster performance in the 1967 war. Such examples illustrate how combat history can be a double-edged sword, influencing strategic decisions in both positive and negative ways. Furthermore, the video explores how cultural factors—such as the highly centralized command structures in Arab militaries—stifle initiative and flexibility. This rigid hierarchy often leads to a lack of combined arms operations, where cooperation between different military branches, such as naval battles and…